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Abstract: This article explores the ways in which the contested reconfiguration of air 
transportation infrastructures following deregulation in Australia resulted in the rescaling 
of air transportation services and their disassociation from the scales of political 
jurisdictions. In tracing the complex interactions between the state’s and firms’ strategies 
and their impacts at different scales, the article contends that it is not sufficient to view 
scale as an arena and outcome of political struggle. Rather, it argues for an activated 
understanding of scale as strategy. The reconfigurations of the scales of transportation 
networks in Australia reveal their profound implications for the production of space: for 
social equity, the fortunes of cities, and the manner of Australia’s insertion in the 
international division of labor. 
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The past 15 years have witnessed a flourishing of interest in the politics of scale and 
scalar structuration (Brenner 1998, 2001; Herod 1997; Howitt 1998;  Smith 1993; 
Swyngedouw 1993, 1997, 2004). This article extends the contributions to this project that 
have explored the uneven and contested scalar reconstitution of capital, labor, and state 
jurisdictions (Cox 2002; Park 2003). It explores how struggles for power in the 
restructuring of transportation networks reflect and rearticulate scaled relationships and, 
as a consequence, reconfigure the relative positions of places in national and global 
economies. It argues that although transportation has been neglected in the rescaling 
literature, its role in the production and reproduction of scale should not be 
underestimated. The article’s theoretical contribution is to extend the notion of rescaling, 
to view it not simply as an arena or outcome of struggle, but also as a strategic instrument 
that is exercised in the cooperative and competitive strategic repositioning of firms and 
nations.  
Understanding the role of transportation in the production of scale is problematic 
because even in an era of privatized infrastructural arrangements, states retain a 
significant interventionist interest in interplace connections. For example, Yeung (2000) 
described how, as part of their regionalization strategies, nation-states pursue the control 
and expansion of international connections by supporting firms that have a close 
relationship to the state and its policy objectives. At the same time, the competitive 
strategies of transportation firms stimulate processes of scale transformation and spatial 
reterritorialization (Brenner 2001). A focus on transportation illuminates the social 
impacts of shifts in relationships between states and firms<<mut>>in this case, by 
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revealing how state-sponsored engagement with global air transportation networks 
exacerbated local social divisions.  
Transportation networks link places through the deployment of technologies that 
transform the relationship between space and time in ways that accelerate or retard the 
spatial circulation of commodities, ideas, and people. As such, they are deeply implicated 
in the construction of space; changes in transportation networks effectively reposition 
places, bringing some closer to centers of power and wealth, while pushing others farther 
away. These changes are never value-neutral or independent; distance is a social product 
that is reshaped in political struggles between constituencies for the control of space. 
Thus, the (re)configuration of transportation networks can be thought of as representing a 
materialization of changing geometries of power in the space economy (Massey 1993). 
Unpacking the social and power relations that shape both transportation networks and 
their production of space can reveal who is included or excluded and empowered or 
disempowered as connectivities change.  
These ideas are fleshed out through an examination of the restructuring of 
scheduled air services in Australia. By interrogating the processes that contributed to the 
production of scale in the years leading up to and after the deregulation of air services, 
this article shows how political struggle has actively reshaped the scaled spatial 
reorganization and territorial reconfigurations of these services. It traces how the 
liberalization process and associated privatization of infrastructures loosened the 
association between scales of economic activity and scales of political 
jurisdiction<<mut>>rupturing the concordances that had characterized the era of 
Keynesian regulation but not releasing the nation-state from its intimate relationship with 
  4 
 
the shifting arenas of capitalist competition and cooperation. The reworked 
postliberalization configuration of Australia’s air transportation network was not simply 
the passive outcome of shifting interfirm and interstate power relations, but was 
consciously produced by the deliberate strategies of states and firms as they recast their 
allegiances and reterritorialized their spheres of influence. The outcomes of these 
processes reflect the uneven influence that different factions of capital (and their 
associated political constituencies) were able to exert over the direction of regulatory 
change. The pattern of postliberalization restructuring of the air service infrastructure 
shows that the introduction of open competition without consideration of its spatial 
dimensions led to the development of spatial monopolies that consolidated global-local 
interconnectivities for some constituencies and places while effectively disconnecting 
others.  
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The second section 
contributes to the theorization of the relationship between air transportation services, 
scalar processes, and regional development and explores the notion of scale as strategy. 
The third section explores these relations by detailing changes in Australia’s regional air 
services, and the fourth section discusses the implications of these shifts. The article 
concludes with a call for further political economy-oriented research into on the 
connections between geographic scale, sociospatial processes, and transportation 
infrastructures. 
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Transportation and Scale 
 Theorizing the role of air transportation in processes of restructuring and rescaling 
requires thinking beyond the commonplace idea<<mut>>which appears frequently in the 
literature on world cities<<mut>>that air connectivities are the passive expression of 
interplace power relationships, a spaceless transaction cost, or an uncomplicated driver of 
state-led regional development (Jin, Wang, and Yu 2004; Smith and Timberlake 1998; 
but see Ciccantell and Bunker 1994). Rather, the approach taken in this article recognizes 
the enduring “interdependent separation” of states and aviation firms that reflects 
historical and other contingencies (Jessop 1990); acknowledges the role of transportation 
networks in both the production of state territorial configurations and the accumulation of 
capital (Harvey 1985); and views transportation as simultaneously a force and a relation 
of production with specific, socially produced spatial dimensions and implications 
(Sheppard and Barnes 1990). Therefore, a practically adequate understanding of the role 
of air transportation in the politically contested production of scalar structuration should 
simultaneously engage multiple threads of inquiry<<mut>>the changing role of states, 
the associated restructuring of firms within the transportation industry, the analysis of 
how the strategies of states and firms produce industries and scales, and the assessment of 
how associated network realignments alter the positions of places. As Cox (2002) argued, 
this endeavor must recognize the uneven and noncoincidental spatial divisions of 
differently scaled arenas of capital, labor, and states. 
States play a crucial role in constructing, maintaining, and reconstructing political 
and economic scales and their territorial expressions. Some observers of neoliberal 
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globalization have contended that the association between scale and territory is 
weakening as transnational flows of money, commodities, and people increase the 
porosity of state boundaries. Thus, the simple notion of the state as a territorial 
“container” for social and economic processes is being replaced by conceptualizations in 
which state power is both socially constructed and relational. In Paasi’s (2005, 110, 112) 
summation, “territories are social processes in which . . . social space and social action 
are inseparable,” where territoriality “is always a manifestation of power relations.” In a 
similar vein, the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty<<mut>>by which states are free 
to choose the form and timing of their interactions with other states<<mut>>is being 
replaced by an awareness of interstate space as a tangle of overlapping and variously 
scaled configurations (see Agnew 1994). Nonetheless, despite the intensification of the 
linkages among the subnational, national, and global scales, national institutions continue 
to mediate these interactions (Weiss 1998). For Mansfield (2005, 459), the now 
“decentered” state remains a key site in the construction of multiscalar formations. 
As infrastructure, transportation networks act as conduits of the nation-state’s 
institutional power; their scope defines the reach of the nation’s authority. Weiss (2006, 
168) extended Mann’s (1993) theories, in which state power is “entwined” in its 
infrastructure, by deploying the concept of “governed interdependence” to explain the 
cooperative relationships between states and firms. In this view, the state’s infrastructural 
objectives<<mut>>as materialized in territorialized regulatory 
frameworks<<mut>>shape both the lateral and hierarchical dimensions of transportation 
networks as they span multiple scales of engagement (see Leitner, Pavlik, and Sheppard 
2002). In a globalizing economy, air transportation networks are a central component of 
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these infrastructures. They define political regions and the scope of markets as well as 
acting as vehicles of economic patriotism (Raguraman 1997). As a result, providers of air 
transportation services are engaged in multiple networks of power relations in which 
commercial issues are muddied by political considerations.  
But the focus on state-firm relationships does not adequately incorporate the 
interdependencies and conflicts between firms or their effects on state-firm relationships 
at different scales. To understand airlines’ simultaneous positioning in multiply scaled 
regulatory contexts and differently organized markets, it is useful to invoke Cox’s (1998, 
2) framing of the politics of scale as the networked interplay between “spaces of 
dependence” and “spaces of engagement.” Spaces of dependence are the nonsubstitutable 
social relations that are necessary for the realization of essential interests. They include 
the dependences between transportation firms<<mut>>in their guise as territorialized 
providers of infrastructure<<mut>>and governments, as well as between firms and 
groups of firms in their various commercial alliances. Spaces of engagement, on the other 
hand, describe the less binding allegiances that reach out across space and time to secure 
the continuing viability of the space of dependence. For firms, they delimit the potential 
spaces of competitive interaction, while for governments, they suggest the potential range 
of regional and international interactions. These overlapping interests reflect and produce 
complexly interdependent patterns of conflict and cooperation that are contingent on a 
range of contextual factors, not the least of which are the specificities of state 
accumulation strategies and the diverse national “varieties of capitalism” that they 
generate (Hall and Sockice 2001). Although the spatial formations of air services 
continue to be governed by national priorities, their different local expressions reflect the 
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tension between economic, political, and developmental objectives. As Swyngedouw 
(1993) argued, the changing spatial organization of transportation networks can be 
understood only in the context of the sociospatial dynamics of specific political-economic 
forms, in which their changing configurations are theorized in both historical and 
geographic frameworks simultaneously. The interplay between state and firm strategies 
has significant implications for understanding the strategic dimensions of scale. 
 
Scale as Strategy 
Complexes of state and firm networks<<mut>>such as those created by air 
services<<mut>>are social relations that produce sociospatial scales. For Swyngedouw 
(1997, 140) these relations are politically contested and fluid, reflecting the complex and 
shifting power relations between social actors. The observable articulations of scale at 
any time thus represent a temporary equilibrium in historically evolving sociospatial 
power struggles or, equivalently, a temporary balance in the complex “geometries of 
power” that link multiple protagonists in complex networks of association (Massey 
1993). Following Harvey’s (1982) insight that every political struggle is inherently 
spatial, Swyngedouw (1997) viewed scale configurations as both the arena in which 
political struggles are played out and the outcome of past struggles.  
However, in the case of transportation infrastructure, scale is not only an effect 
and a medium of political struggle, but also a strategy and a tactic used by both states and 
firms, in complex interaction, as they pursue their partly complementary and partly 
conflicting interests. In this context, both states and firms engage in the discursive 
reconstruction of scale to justify and legitimize their commercial, territorial, or political 
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objectives. As actors’ differentiated capacities to impose their own constructions, 
discourses, and narratives shape understandings of scale, perceptions of scale take on an 
epistemological dimension and become “a way of framing” political spatiality, or a form 
of knowing that political agents deploy discursively in arguments that change the way in 
which arenas of interaction are known and apprehended (K. Jones 1998, 27). These 
creative reimaginings of scale contribute to political and economic projects that entangle 
scale with power, knowledge, and territory.  
From this perspective, scale is purposefully created in initiatives that define the 
spatial reach and constituent elements of spaces of cooperation and competition. The 
spatial and scalar fix of a dominant state or firm reflects and reinforces its power 
networks and at the same time justifies the exclusion of spaces and relations that conflict 
with its strategic interests. For both firms and states, accepting an existing scale 
configuration therefore implies accepting the power relations that it embodies. 
Competitive firms resist any containment within politically defined territories or scaled 
regulatory spaces. Air service firms have responded to the intractability of regulatory 
barriers by pressuring states for regulatory liberalizations and by creating interfirm 
alliances that enable them to bridge regulatory barriers. As these realignments create 
opportunities to “jump” between existing state-defined crystallizations of scale, they also 
produce new articulations of scale that disrupt existing power relationships, rework 
power geometries, and recast territorializations. In a strategic view of scale, when states 
and firms in the transportation sector forge new alliances, they not only jump between, 
rework, or modify existing scales (Smith 1992), but also generate new sociospatial scales 
that materialize as newly configured service networks with their own territorial reaches 
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and hierarchical linkages. Since these reworkings destabilize the previously dominant 
power geometry, redefining scale becomes a means to escape established institutionalized 
structures (see also Amin and Thrift 1994). These strategies can put state sovereignty at 
risk if the resulting reconfigurations of transportation networks erase or transcend the 
established scaled configurations of state power.  
Deploying rescaling as strategy creates a means to escape old definitions, create 
new metaphors with new spatialities, and shift arenas of competition and cooperation. In 
this conceptualization, scale is not simply the expression of shifting power relations, but 
is constituted by the interacting strategies and tactics of willful agents. The capacity to 
escape existing scaled rules, regulations, and definitions and to infiltrate interstitial spaces 
that are not governed<<mut>>or valued<<mut>>by established hegemonic powers is a 
key to political and economic advantage (Mann 2006, 384). The interactive nature of 
these processes can be understood by extending Jessop’s (1990, 205; 2005) “strategic-
relational” approach to states and firms simultaneously, so that both the state and the 
institutions of capital are viewed as social relations imbued with projects, strategic 
orientations, and associated tactical maneuvers that involve complex mixes of 
cooperation and competition. The scope for the reflexive reorganization of scale then 
reflects the context, history, and timing of the interplay between “reflexively reorganized 
structural configurations” and the “recursively selected strategies and tactics” of states 
and firms as they maneuver strategically in the same territorial and interterritorial spaces. 
From this perspective, scale is intertwined with power relations and with strategy. 
Viewing scale as strategy shifts the research task from mapping arenas and 
outcomes (Brenner 2001) to focusing on ways in which protagonists deploy rescaling in 
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their arsenal of competitive and cooperative strategies. The next section draws on the 
example of the Australian aviation sector to demonstrate the strategic deployment of 
scale. 
 
Rescaling Air Services in Australia  
Australia’s postliberalization restructuring of the aviation industry unfolded in 
three phases, each reflecting a different strategic deployment of scale relations. In the first 
phase, the rigid three-tiered state-led scale configuration created by Keynesian regulation 
was dismantled. In the second<<mut>>a chaotic period in which firms and states actively 
pursued noncoincidental and uneven restructuring<<mut>>rescaling and territorial 
expansion strategies seemed to collapse scales into lateral laceworks. These opposing 
strategies ruptured the concordance between the state’s and firms’ scales of activity. In 
the third phase, after the crisis of 2001, a newly scaled firm-led structure consolidated 
spatial monopolies and institutionalized social inequalities. The remainder of this section 
details these changes. 
 
Creating the National Scale 
Australia was created in 1901 as a federation of its constituent states. The 
Australian Constitution defines the powers of its three tiers of government<<mut>>local, 
state, and federal<<mut>>and imposes clear limits on the extent to which these scaled 
structures can be reworked. Federal powers coordinate interstate and international 
relations and connections. States retain control over their internal affairs and are 
responsible for intrastate services, including transportation services. The local level has 
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limited powers, a modest revenue-raising capacity, and limited involvement in the 
planning or delivery of interplace transportation infrastructure.  
The physical configuration of air services in Australia developed to reflect and 
create the unique characteristics of Australia’s physical, political, and economic 
geographies. When the air service network was established in the 1930s, it relied on 
entrepreneurs, mostly from relatively isolated regional areas, who built up local services 
to meet local needs. The uneven successes of these often-risky ventures combined with 
the patterns of subsequent mergers and takeovers to produce a peculiar and serendipitous 
industrial geography. Pioneering air services operated under state-level regulation before 
World War II, although the Air Navigation Act of 1920 enabled the federal government 
to exercise limited control..  
After World War II, Australia’s air transportation network was shaped by a policy 
framework in which the federal government purposefully created a national scale. In 
1945, motivated by security concerns, nation-building objectives, and infant industry 
arguments, the federal (Labor) government sought to nationalize emerging interstate air 
services and bring them under its direct control. In this era, the federal government’s 
nation-building vision materialized in its objective of creating a national infrastructure. 
However, airline firms<<mut>>then embedded in state-level political and social 
networks<<mut>>vehemently opposed the national strategy and challenged the 
government’s enabling legislation, the Australia National Airways Act of 1945 in the 
High Court. The Court subsequently found in the airlines’ favor.1 The intense public 
                                                      
 1 The Court concluded that nationalization contravened Section 92 of the Constitution, 
which guarantees free trade among the states (see Australian National Airways v Commonwealth 
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debate generated over nationalization reflected the then-strong class divisions between 
the Socialist-oriented Labor and Conservative (National Party) constituencies.2  
Following the Labor government’s electoral defeat in 1949, the incoming 
Conservative administration took a different strategic approach to the creation of a 
national air network. It established the Two Airline Policy (TAP), a managed duopoly 
that comprised one public and one private airline<<mut>>Australian Airlines  and 
Australian National Airlines, respectively. This politically astute compromise promoted 
national development without resorting to nationalization and, at the same time, avoided 
the private aviation monopoly that was likely to emerge in an unregulated market. At the 
time, Australia’s internal air routes did not generate sufficient traffic to sustain 
competitive markets. 
Given constitutional limits on federal power, however, this compromise could be 
achieved only through a complex web of interventionist enabling legislation. The Airlines 
Agreement Act of 1952, which ensured that both airlines were treated equally, was later 
reinforced by the Air Navigation (Charges) Bill, the Income Tax Social Services 
Assessment (Air Navigation) Bill, and the Australian National Airlines Bill. The Airlines 
Equipment Bill of 1958 drew on the federal government’s power to control international 
trade to complete the TAP regulatory framework. It placed limits on the importation of 
aircraft to secure state control of airline seat capacities.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
(1946) 71 CLR 29). The outcome highlights the nation-state’s reliance on the social power of its 
constituencies (see Jessop 1990).  
 2 These disputes also had a territorial dimension; New South Wales traditionally 
supported free trade, while Victoria favored industry protectionism (Stilwell 1992, 131). 
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The TAP was designed to maintain services in Australia’s low density aviation 
markets. It stringently regulated firms, prices, and safety standards on the designated 
interstate trunk routes connecting the state capitals and a handful of larger urban centers. 
Interfirm competition was limited to nonprice factors and, as anticipated by Hotelling 
(1929), the two national airlines matched services on most routes. In addition to highly 
interventionist regulation, the federal government supported air services through direct 
and indirect subsidization and provided the infrastructure of airports, navigation, air 
traffic control, and associated services. 
Together, as these interventions created a “national” scale of aviation 
infrastructure, they consolidated the authority of the national scale and facilitated the 
emergence of an integrated national economy. The TAP’s webs of regulation created 
spaces of dependence that bound both national trunk airlines to the will of the nation-
state. The resulting service configuration maintained state-based territorializations, 
promoted national cohesion, and encouraged even development across politically defined 
urban centers. This distinctive geography positioned state capitals as growth centers, 
nodes in the trunk network, hubs for intrastate services, and (until 1992 regulatory 
reforms) entry points for international traffic (see Figure 1).  
This configuration also reflected Australia’s topography and urbanized settlement 
patterns.3 The only state that developed relatively dense short-haul air service networks 
was New South Wales, where the Great Dividing Range poses a formidable barrier. The 
flat topography in other parts of Australia is suited to road and rail transportation, which 
carries over 80 percent of commodity exports to ports. As a result, scheduled regional air 
                                                      
 3 More than 70 percent of the Australian population lives in the state capital cities.  
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transportation services have a limited role in the direct circulation of commodity-based 
capital.  
The TAP was supported by successive federal governments regardless of their 
political leanings. Most states complemented the national structure with an internal 
system of regulation and used various forms of route tendering to support and subsidize 
local services. Meanwhile, Australia’s government-owned international flag carrier, 
Qantas, enjoyed monopoly rights over international services. Over time, these 
interlocking structures formalized state-federal relations and crystallized sociospatial 
scales. The activities of aviation firms were contained within the rigid territorializations 
of political jurisdictions. The TAP structure persisted until the 1980s, although its 
maintenance required increasing intervention.4  
 
Reimaging Scale 
By the late 1970s, the rigidly scaled landscape of air services had become the 
arena in which new political struggles were played out. Australia faced that decade’s 
deepening economic crises by planning the rapid internationalization of its economy. It 
was believed that Australia’s prosperity would be secured by pursuing an aggressive 
trade liberalization agenda and exploiting its comparative advantage in agricultural and 
extractive industries. The discursively constructed imperatives of “globalization,” in the 
borderless formulation associated with Ohmae (1986), impelled the nation toward 
                                                      
 4 The Airlines Agreement Act 1961 extended the TAP to 1977 and, in 1981, the Airlines 
Equipment Amendment Act strengthened the regulatory framework by effectively prohibiting 
new entrants.  
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strategic internationalization,. In the economic sphere, the new accumulation strategy 
favored export industries, promoted the development of large firms that could compete on 
the international stage, and encouraged the consolidation of “national” product markets. 
In the political arena, it led the Australian government to champion the development of 
Asia-Pacific regional governance through participation in APEC (Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation) and other fora. Since improving international connectivities would be a 
central component of the new policy approach, the nation-state became an active 
promoter of the internationalization of air service networks. In this way, pressures for 
reform of the airline industry were part of a broader strategic realignment of the 
Australian space economy.  
The reform process’s orientation toward regulatory liberalization, privatization, 
and internationalization was encouraged by the growing influence of neoliberal economic 
discourses and theories. Public choice theory was especially influential. In policy 
contexts, this approach rejects the concept of an undifferentiated national or community 
interest and insists that well-meaning policies do not necessarily operate in the public 
good. Its view of state policy initiatives as commodities that are liable to be captured by 
interest groups directs attention to identifying who benefits from and who pays for 
interventionist policies (Stigler 1971). Analyses motivated by these discourses revealed 
that travelers on profitable intercity trunk routes were subsidising travelers on marginal 
rural routes. Moreover, the “rents” extracted from the regulatory framework appeared to 
accrue to airline firms and their (well-paid) workforces at the expense of “consumers” 
(i.e., the mainly business travelers on dense intercity routes). After segmenting the 
service space into profitable and not-profitable subsectors, neoliberal economic analysis 
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could then demonstrate the inefficiency of cross-subsidizations in which neither subsector 
operated at its marginal costs. Accordingly, new research attributed the high cost of 
Australian air services to the inefficiencies of the regulated TAP framework, rather than 
to the peculiarities of Australia’s history and geography (Forsyth and Hocking 1985; 
Kirby 1986). The associated narratives of waste<<mut>>the image of two half-full 
airplanes routinely flying in parallel on identical routes<<mut>>made it politically 
difficult to defend the TAP or its approach to the air service infrastructure. Stories 
celebrating the successes of the deregulation of air services in the United States 
encouraged the Australian federal government to embrace the apparent efficiencies of 
market forces.  
By disarticulating profitable from unprofitable locations, the discourses of public 
choice theory worked to dissolve the coherence of the national scale. Public choice theory 
not only undermined the goal of even, managed development that had sustained the close 
relationship between the national state and air service providers under TAP, but also 
disrupted the cooperative relationships between airlines and their customers in other 
sectors of the economy. As the new policy discourses separated economic from social 
policy considerations, they excluded constituencies that viewed air transportation as an 
essential social service and weakened the rural voice. At the same time, they gave voice 
to exporters, tourism promoters, transnational firms, and other segments that believed 
their success had been inhibited by the TAP. These shifting geometries of national power 
relations fragmented the cooperative spaces of dependence that had tied airlines to state 
instrumentalities.  
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To escape these disempowering developments, the private airline of the TAP 
duopoly, now Ansett Airlines, sought to expand its market scope. In 1980, it jumped 
scale by operating a charter flight to Singapore in direct contravention of Australia’s 
international aviation agreements, and in 1985 its regional subsidiary East-West Airlines 
attempted to jump into the national trunk market. Ansett’s expansionist 
strategy<<mut>>which did not challenge existing scale configurations but merely sought 
to jump between them<<mut>>necessarily conflicted with the established powers, 
alienated Ansett from the national bureaucracy, and undermined Ansett’s relational 
position in local networks of state-firm interdependencies.  
 
Liberalization and Strategic Rescaling 
In 1986, an independent government inquiry recommended the cautious partial 
deregulation of air services (May 1986). However, the government took a more radical 
view and resolved that the TAP would be withdrawn, effective November 1990, and that 
airline regulation would fall into line with the competition-oriented policies that governed 
other industries (Evans 1987). Air services would no longer be assessed as a component 
of the social infrastructure with socially determined levels of provision, but as economic 
ventures guided by market demand. This change implied a reassessment of the nature of 
the Australian aviation sector, since competition policies can succeed only in markets that 
are large enough to sustain multiple competitive air service providers. In effect, the 
government had decided that the market was “contestable,” a condition in which firms 
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that are fearful of the threat of new entrants are expected to behave as if they were 
operating in competitive environment (see Baumol 1967; Joy 1986).5  
Soon after, in 1989, in anticipation of substantial changes in their work 
environment, Australian airline pilots began strike action. The long-running dispute 
alienated pilots from the labor movement and undermined community support for the 
aviation sector (see Bray and Wailes 1999). The dispute highlighted aviation workers’ 
relatively generous wages and conditions and fueled the perception that firms and their 
workers had been the beneficiaries of the government’s subsidization of aviation 
infrastructure. The eventual resounding defeat of the pilots’ campaign created an 
opportunity for airlines to reduce their staff numbers and introduce more efficient staff 
deployment systems. The dispute damaged the networks that had united air service 
providers and the national government. The government subsequently distanced itself 
from the aviation sector.  
When deregulation was implemented the following year, it produced complexly 
interrelated changes as firms revised their strategies and reconfigured their services to 
take advantage of the new environment. These changes altered the scope and content of 
the preliberalization scales of service provision and  reworked the relationships between 
them. The effects differed for the national, local, and international scales. 
                                                      
 5 This conclusion, which was based on aviation’s low entry and exit costs (on a route-by-
route basis) and its limited opportunities for the exploitation of economies of scale, 
underestimated the market power derived from alliances, the control of computerized reservation 
systems, frequent-flyer schemes, and fleet efficiencies. 
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 National Trunk Services. At the national scale, liberalization opened national 
trunk routes to competition, allowed new players to enter the market, and gave airlines 
control over the selection of routes and pricing. For the first time, airlines could initiate 
increase, decrease, or discontinue services, depending on the profitability of the routes. 
Soon after deregulation, two new airlines (Compass and Compass II) joined the trunk 
network, but they were quickly defeated by the incumbents in a debilitating price war. 
The system temporarily returned to its preliberalization two-airline structure. Additional 
regulatory reforms in 1992 merged the two state-owned airlines, Qantas and Australian 
Airlines, and allowed Australia’s international flag carrier Qantas to operate on domestic 
routes.6 Although critics viewed the merger as “fattening up” Qantas in preparation for its 
privatization (Pyman n.d.), this national strategy strengthened Qantas’s international 
position by providing it with a secure domestic base. However, the 
Qantas<<nut>>Australian Airlines merger also undermined the possibility of a 
competitive national-scale market because it created a firm that was too large and capital-
rich to be challenged in the domestic arena. Conscious of Ansett’s increased 
vulnerability, its owners responded: first, by seeking an international buyer that could 
match Qantas’s market and capital resources, and second, by expanding Ansett’s 
operations into the international arena.7 The competitive environment forced Ansett to 
                                                      
6 The sale of Australian Airlines had been planned at least three years before 
liberalization, in the Australian Airlines (Conversion to Public Company) Bill of 1987.  
7 In the 1980s, both Qantas and Ansett had expanded to New Zealand, Papua New 
Guinea, and nearby island holiday destinations through wholly owned subsidiaries. After 1992, 
these locations could be served directly. 
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match Qantas’s operational scope. In preparation for intensified national and international 
competition, both Qantas and Ansett consolidated their authority over subnational feeder 
routes.  
These strategic reorientations upended the preliberalization landscape of 
horizontal regulation-based scales of interaction and replaced them with vertical cross-
scale alignments that were based on coordinating passenger flows. These innovations 
blurred the boundaries between scales, although the operational separations of the 
preliberalization era persisted. By the mid-1990s, it appeared that deregulation had had 
little effect on services and a questionable impact on prices (Bureau of Transport and 
Communication Economics, BTCE 1994; Grimm and Milloy 1993), an outcome that 
Quiggin (1997) later attributed to the intrinsic noncontestability of Australia’s thin 
aviation markets.  
This temporary equilibrium was disrupted when the Conservative Liberal 
government came to power in 1996 and introduced radical reforms to the labor market. 
The Workplace Relations Act 1996 (WRA) rescaled the practices of labor regulation 
from the national to the firm scale. Its firm-level “Enterprise” industrial relations 
agreements aimed to replace the (Keynesian) centralized wages system and undermine 
the power of unions. The WRA tipped the two-airline power balance toward crisis by 
facilitating the entry of highly competitive low-cost carriers that would not be constrained 
by a legacy of preliberalization industrial agreements. Henceforth, new airlines would be 
free to introduce the labor-saving technologies, policies, and practices that had been 
pioneered by American and European discount airlines. Thus, when Virgin Blue entered 
the national trunk market in 2000, it had the advantage of significantly lower labor costs 
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and significantly greater scheduling flexibility than the two incumbent airlines. 
Moreover, since it selectively restricted its operations to the most profitable trunk and 
tourist routes, it was able to function at higher profit margins than the established carriers.  
Virgin Blue’s entry generated intense price competition on primary trunk 
corridors (principally Melbourne<<nut>>Sydney<<nut>>Brisbane) and led to a 
reorganization of the trunk network as destinations and service frequencies adjusted to 
the new demand created by cut-price airfares. Because sophisticated route-planning 
technologies enabled airlines to assess accurately the viability of different routes, route 
combinations, and fare structures, the trunk network was redefined as the (shifting) set of 
routes that could generate sufficient traffic to be served by larger commercial aircraft. 
Northern tourist hubs (Cairns, Townsville, and Broome) were elevated to national trunk 
stature, while less popular destinations (Launceston) were effectively demoted to the 
regional network. Thus, the composition and spatial organization of the national network 
began to reflect the economic power relations between places in the Australian space 
economy, rather than the status of cities in the nation’s political federation.  
 Regional Services. The national deregulation of air services in 1990 reverberated 
across scales to reshape sub-national air transportation networks. In the scaled 
preliberalization structure, regional air services had operated within state-level regulatory 
jurisdictions. With the exception of New South Wales, which continued to regulate routes 
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through Sydney’s congested Kingsford-Smith airport, the state governments deregulated 
their services in rough conjunction with federal changes.8  
In the absence of subnational regulation, the national liberalization would have 
significant impacts on regional services. In contrast to Europe and the United States, 
Australia’s deregulation was not accompanied by a community service obligation to 
isolated regions. On the contrary, national deregulation was accompanied by a 
reinterpretation of federal power that enabled the federal government to restrict its 
subnational responsibilities to the management of safety and security standards:  
 
Generally, it is now accepted that the Commonwealth’s power is restricted 
to matters concerned with safety, security, regularity and efficiency, where 
regularity and efficiency have been interpreted as relating to safety and 
navigational aspects. (Bureau of Transport Economics, BTE 1999) 
 
This reversal of the nation-building interpretation of federal power that had created the 
national air network 50 years earlier implied a discursive reconstruction of national 
authority and a shift in the relationship between the nation and its internal regions.  
Following this revised understanding, the federal government progressively 
withdrew its financial support for national aviation infrastructure, moving toward a user-
pays system and downscaling operational costs and responsibilities to the states, local 
                                                      
8 Queensland liberalized in 1987, the Northern Territory in 1992, Western Australia in 
1994, and Tasmania in 1997. South Australia and Victoria had no local regulatory framework and 
were effectively deregulated by federal reforms in 1978. 
  24 
 
areas, and firms. In 1998, a major component of the national aviation infrastructure, the 
Federal Airports Corporation, was dismantled. International airports were privatized, and 
local airports were transferred to local community control. Where the local market could 
not support commercial airport services, local and state authorities were expected to step 
in: “The viability of air services is a matter for the airlines. . . . In the final analysis it is 
up to local communities to support these services for them to remain viable” (Boswell 
2001). The clear message was that local communities and air enthusiasts would no longer 
be subsidized from the national purse. As user costs escalated, cash-strapped regional 
operators found it increasingly difficult to meet the government’s safety requirements 
(Regional Aviation Association of Australia, RAAA 2004). 
In response to this revision of interscale relations, the major airlines reorganized 
to quarantine the financial risks of regional provision. Before liberalization, the regional 
routes served by the two major airlines had been subsidized by the profits that were 
generated on high-density national trunk routes. In the more competitive 
postliberalization context, the flow of funds to subsidize marginal regional services 
quickly evaporated as firms moved to route-based service assessments (see Farrington 
1985). As in other sectors, services were reorganized using the tactics of vertical 
disintegration. By 1997, the two national carriers operated direct services on only 15 
percent of the regional routes, but their various alliance partners and subsidiaries operated 
on 83 percent of the routes and accounted for 97 percent of all regional passengers (BTE 
1999). The airlines increasingly avoided wasteful competition on regional routes by 
establishing route-based spatial monopolies<<mut>>or, equivalently, by demarcating 
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territories within scales. Figure 2 shows that only the highest traffic routes sustained two 
or more competitive operators. 
 Less tourist-oriented regional air services remained marginal as passenger traffic 
fluctuated with the fortunes of the rural economy. As the 1990s came to a close, a number 
of larger regional firms<<mut>>including Yanda Airlines, Country Connection, and 
Flight West<<mut>>failed after being unable to offset their increasing costs by 
increasing prices or load factors. In addition, the volume of nonscheduled “general 
aviation” traffic fell substantially. In sum, the nation-state’s reimagining of Australia’s 
regions encouraged the disintegration of the preliberalization regional scale and its 
replacement by a new subnational framework that was more closely articulated with 
national and international services. 
Internationalization. In the early 1990s, the federal government’s 
internationalization strategy championed the creation of new scales of governance in 
Southeast Asia, primarily through APEC and the creation of a common market with New 
Zealand. The internationalization of air services began in 1992, when, following the 
simple logic that more incoming planes equal more tourists and therefore more income 
and jobs in regional Australia, the federal government allowed international carriers 
limited access to Australian airports.  
Next, the partial privatization of Qantas aimed to integrate it into the fabric of 
(private) international aviation capital. After Singapore Airlines (SIA), Northwest, and 
British Airways (BA), showed interest, a 25-percent share in Qantas was eventually sold 
to BA. The resulting Anglophile alliance on the strategically important 
Sydney<<nut>>London route improved the position of BA and Qantas relative to their 
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principal competitors, SIA and Emirates, but had the effect of undermining Australia’s 
political strategy of regional scale building. Qantas was fully privatized in 1995, although 
limits on foreign ownership remained.  
Conscious of the limitations of Australia’s small aviation market, the federal 
government also began actively promoting a Single Aviation Market (SAM) between 
Australia and New Zealand (Findlay and Kissling 1997; Kissling 1998). But this 1992 
reterritorialization of the market ignored the realities of the uneven regional geometries of 
state and firm power and met opposition from Air New Zealand, which sought support 
from its national government to “avoid the risk of being swamped or at least marginalised 
by its larger trans-Tasman competitors” (Air New Zealand 2003, 5). Australia withdrew 
from the SAM in 1994, partly to protect Qantas’s position prior to its full privatization 
and partly because it had underestimated the complexities of cross-national regulatory 
harmonization (Findlay and Kissling 1997).  
The federal (Labor) government’s strategy from 1990 to 1996 had aimed to build 
Qantas’s stature and resources to enable it to prosper in a deregulated international 
environment. But as these reforms blurred the division between national and international 
services and scales, they unleashed supranational competitive forces that ultimately recast 
the geometries of power between nations in the region as both New Zealand and 
Singapore perceived Australia’s strategy as expansionist (Sullivan 2002). In 1996, the 
incoming Howard Liberal government retreated from the politics of regional scale 
building (Higgott and Nossal 1997). The Australia<<nut>>New Zealand SAM with 
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cabotage rights eventually became a reality in November 1996 after Australia’s policy 
shift.9  
Meanwhile, the international context of the airline industry was changing rapidly. 
The worldwide trend toward airline alliances had a profound impact on power 
relationships between airlines and impelled local firms to shift from the market-expansion 
strategies of the 1990s to a new focus on the economies of network integration. Ansett 
Airlines quickly realized that a suitable international alliance would enable it to compete 
with the expanded Qantas organization. It entered code-share arrangements with a 
number of overseas airlines in the mid-1990s and became a full member of the 
international Star Alliance in 1997. At about the same time, Qantas’s membership in the 
opposing oneworld alliance further consolidated its association with BA. The emergence 
of international alliances facilitated the introduction of technologies for “seamless” 
international transfers of passengers and provided a means for firms to escape, at least 
partially, the limitations of national-scale regulation. This firm-led international scale-
building strategy irrevocably altered relations in the region as cooperation between 
Ansett, SIA, and Air New Zealand improved their competitive positions relative to 
Qantas, the only “local” representative of the oneworld alliance. As the millennium drew 
to a close, the control of sub-national feeder routes in Australia became increasingly 
important to maintaining the status of Australian airlines in their respective international 
networks. The international, national, and subnational scales appeared to be flattening 
                                                      
9 In international aviation agreements, cabotage is the right of an airline from Country A 
to carry revenue traffic between two points within Country B. 
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into a global lacework of horizontal networks that were based on streamlined flows of 
passengers.  
After Australia’s change of government in 1996, geopolitical concerns began to 
overshadow competitive interests as it became evident that the association between SIA 
and Ansett would substantially improve Singapore’s position in global spaces of flows. 
As Rimmer (1996) had warned, Singapore’s geographic location made it a natural hub in 
Southeast Asia, while Qantas’s international position was precarious, given Australia’s 
peripheral position and its distance from the world’s main east<<nut>>west air traffic 
flows (see also Findlay 1985). As the geopolitical stakes were raised, SIA’s 1999 friendly 
bid for control of Ansett Airlines was vetoed by Air New Zealand, as was its right as a 
SIA shareholder, and Ansett’s ownership fell to the smaller and undercapitalized Air New 
Zealand. 
Ansett Airlines’ subsequent collapse on 12 September 2001 was the culmination 
of tensions that had been building throughout the 1990s. At the time, this was the largest 
corporate collapse in Australian history, with some 16,000 direct employees and 5,000 
indirect (contractor) employees losing their jobs (Weller and Webber 2004). The 
determining factor in the collapse was competition from Virgin Blue and Qantas in 
Australia’s finite market, although other contributing factors included the falling number 
of passengers and increasing costs (Painter 2001, BTRE 2004). Air New Zealand was 
accused of sacrificing Ansett in political maneuvers that were intended to secure its own 
survival (see Easdown and Wilms 2002). Qantas was accused of targeting Ansett in 
response to Virgin’s entry (Virgin Blue, 2003). The Australian government chose not to 
intervene at this moment in the creative destruction of market capitalism. This 
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demonstrated its anxiety with the idea of  a “local” firm aligning with competing regional 
economic interests. It also highlighted the depth of Ansett’s alienation from the power 
networks of the Australian state. 
 
Reasserting the National Scale 
Ansett’s demise prompted further reconfigurations of the regional geometries of air 
transportation. Internationally, Ansett’s fall prevented SIA from gaining a foothold in the 
Australian market, thereby securing Qantas’s international position. Although Qantas’s 
share of Australia’s international traffic has subsequently fallen, its profit rates have 
remained robust as a result of the integration of services, improved route targeting, and 
labor-saving reorganization (see Figure 3). In recent statements, Qantas has sought to 
disassociate itself from “national” obligations and to reposition itself as a “global” player. 
However, at the same time as it has lobbied for greater access to international sources of 
capital, it has sought regulatory protection from the “predatory” strategies of SIA (Chin, 
Dynon, Takeda, and Dao 2002). In 2005, it convinced the federal government not to 
allow SIA access to Australia<<nut>>U.S. air routes and used the threat of the offshore 
relocation of aviation maintenance jobs to press home its case.10  
 After Ansett’s collapse, Qantas and Virgin Blue quickly incorporated Ansett’s 
more profitable routes. Domestically, Ansett’s collapse ensured the ascendancy of Virgin 
Blue’s flexible, low-wage business model, which has now been extended with the 
addition of Qantas’s discount subsidiary Jetstar. In the post-Ansett environment, both 
                                                      
10  As this article goes the press, Qantas is the subject of a take-over bid by a 
conglomerate of private equity investors. Public debate has been intense, with opinion 
now approaching the conclusion that Qantas’s sale would not be in the national interest.  
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national airlines have adopted “leaner” service delivery models. Qantas has downgraded 
its economy-class services and has adopted a more confrontational attitude toward its 
unionized workforce. Meanwhile, Virgin Blue is building its customer services to 
reposition itself as the “second Ansett” (Thomas 2005). On high-demand routes, 
competition has led to lower prices and more frequent services, but less profitable routes 
have been downgraded to the subnational scale. These changes are shown in Figure 4.  
The major losers of the post-Ansett restructuring have been subnational services. 
Of the 45 regional airlines that operated scheduled services in 1998, 23 had ceased 
operations by 2004 (Regional Aviation Association of Australia 2004), while the number 
of scheduled flights on regional routes fell by 22 percent between 2001 and 2004 
(Frawley 2005). The uneven spatial distribution of these changes is shown in Figure 5.  
 The contraction of the regional services has fragmented the subnational scale. 
Restructured versions of Ansett’s largest regional subsidiaries<<mut>>Hazelton Airlines, 
Kendall Airlines, and Skywest<<mut>>recommenced operation in the months after 
Ansett’s collapse.  Sustained by new sources of capital and modified route structures, 
these now-independent firms became the core providers in a new regional subsector that 
was closely articulated with the national trunk system through alliances with the Qantas 
regional brand QantasLink. Although not directly subsidized, the federal government, 
Qantaslink benefits from state support via supply contracts (especially mail deliveries). In 
an explicit expression of the space-technology nexus, QantasLink has restricted its direct 
regional services to destinations that generate sufficient traffic to operate at profitable 
load ratios with the Qantas Dash 8 turbo-prop fleet. Less dense routes are left to “better 
equipped” affiliate airlines (Qantas 2004). This reorganization breaks the pre-
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deregulation regional scale into two tiers that are separated by their demand 
characteristics. However, since code sharing with regional affiliates provides Qantas with 
detailed knowledge of traffic levels on multiple origin-destination pairs, it empowers 
Qantas to expand or contract its direct provision in accordance with the vagaries of 
demand, thus maximizing its profitability at the expense of smaller airlines. The new 
structure consolidates Qantas’s power over the subnational network in an organizational 
arrangement that distances the regions from national centers of firm and state power. In 
rural Australia, then, the upshot of Ansett Airline’s failure has been a Qantas-led 
reconfiguration of a slimmed-down regional air network. Subsequently, these changes 
have simulated reregulation in the less populated states<<mut>>Western Australia, South 
Australia, and Northern Territory<<mut>>where air travel is essential to the survival of 
rural settlements. Open competition, it seems, has proved that the market on many 
Australian regional routes is not sufficiently dense to support competitive services.  
Continuing the downward trend that began in the 1990s, the losers in this process 
are the communities in unregulated states and off-shore islands where neither the market 
nor the state provides services. In these places, declining rural populations; drought; 
improvements to road, rail, and sea transportation; and the withdrawal of regional 
administrative infrastructures (banks and governmental departments) have undermined 
the demand for air travel. The reduced frequency of services and/or relegation to nine-
seater unpressurized aircraft has disadvantaged bush communities by reducing their 
access to urban-based specialized services, increasing travel risks, and adding to the 
inconveniences of geographic isolation<<mut>>small aircraft are not able to carry 
wheelchairs, coffins, or animals (Country Women’s Association 2001). In these places, 
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functions that were once central to the national transportation infrastructure are shifting to 
the welfare sector; for example, some transportation for essential medical treatment is 
now provided by charitable organizations using volunteer pilots.  
 
Implications for the Space Economy 
This history demonstrates that the federal government did not simply deregulate 
to provide a level national playing field on which capitalist competition was played out. 
Rather, it actively restructured sociospatial scales in pursuit of “borderless” international 
economic integration. Although the nation-state’s attempt to disown the sub-national 
level and to create a new transnational scale of engagement failed, the outcome of the 
process has complicated the boundaries between international, national, and subnational 
jurisdictions; added a fourth tier to a rescaled service network; and increased the role of 
technology in defining the scale and scope of air service infrastructures. Table 1 
summarizes the scale implications of these realignments. 
In the regulated era of Keynesian interventionism, the rigid scale hierarchy of air 
services was matched to political jurisdictions. In the first phase of liberalization, the 
nation-state moved from the tiered, hierarchical Keynesian framework centered at the 
national scale in a dual motion that sought on the one hand to create a transnational Asia 
Pacific scale and on the other to localize responsibility for subnational services. As firms 
sought to accommodate these changes by building vertical networks that spanned the 
subnational, national, and transnational scales, they replaced the scale hierarchy of the 
Keynesian era with a fragmented multiscalar configuration that was characterized by 
multiple firm-led spatial monopolies. Cooperative alliances at the international scale 
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helped firms to secure these spatial niches (see also Bisseseur and Alamdari 1998; Nolan, 
Ritchie, and Rowcroft 2001). The outcome was a reconfigured domestic network in 
which services follow passenger demand in a new stratification that is based on the 
technological capacities of airline fleets. Qantas consolidated its control over 
international connections, but as a component in a mesh of international services. In sum, 
Australia’s air service networks no longer align neatly with the scale configuration of 
political jurisdictions.  
As airlines target niche market segments, their relationships with different class 
segments of Australian society are also changing. The Qantas trunk network interfaces 
with international services. This full-fare, full-service hub-and-spoke network is designed 
for the command and control functions of the national economy<<mut>>the efficient 
delivery of personnel, high-value tourists, information (mail), and high-value 
commodities. Meanwhile, the Virgin Blue and Jetstar networks cater to more budget-
conscious markets via “flat” point-to-point services that are tailored to the predictable 
routines of vacationers, tourists, and commuting workers. These demand-driven services 
are vulnerable to fluctuations in disposable incomes. Qantas’s control of regional services 
has redrawn the boundaries of the space-economy, since Qantas now determines which 
places are connected directly to Australia’s centers of knowledge and expertise. The 
much-diminished affiliate regional network has become an access network for rural 
communities, where flights are scheduled for the convenience of rural-to-city (as opposed 
to city-to-rural) trips. A fifth tier of air passenger services is emerging as the rich and 
powerful increasingly travel in private aircraft, accessing small local airports (and thereby 
avoiding the inconveniences of security procedures at large airports). This class-based 
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fragmentation separates globally connected urban growth centers from regional cities. 
Viewed from a space-time interchange perspective, these changes bring some places and 
people closer to centers of power and push others farther away; the implications for the 
longer-term fortunes of places are profound.  
Overall, the changes in the spatial and scalar configurations of domestic air 
passenger services can be understood as the material expression of a more fundamental 
shift in the mode of Australia’s articulation with the spatial organization of world 
capitalism. These new power geometries mean that the air transportation infrastructure 
now follows (rather than leads) the patterns of city development. The new configuration 
repositions Australia’s gateway cities (Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, and Perth) as 
outward-looking connectors in a global city network and as nodes in an international 
division of labor. This systemization benefits and empowers urban control centers and 
their international links and disempowers regional communities.  
 
Conclusion 
Air transportation services are a necessary component in capitalist accumulation, 
circuits of production, and the production of value. Their quality both reflects and creates 
the status of places in the hierarchies of world capitalism. Understanding the strategies of 
privatized transportation firms in market-oriented economies, and how they react to and 
stimulate regulatory change, is fundamental to understanding rescaling, urban formations, 
and sociopolitical processes.  
This article has shown that the political project that led to the deregulation of 
Australia’s air services ignored the inherent spatiality of the capitalist space economy, the 
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political dimensions of economic activity, and the complex interdependencies between 
scales. The restructuring process ruptured the coincidence between transportation 
networks and political jurisdictions and fragmented the market, creating spatially and 
socially differentiated services that both reflect and reinforce social inequalities. For 
transportation research, this discussion shows that it is not sufficient to measure the 
aggregate number of passengers who travel between two points, but that the type of 
travel, the direction of travel, and the nature and structure of allegiances between service 
providers and nations are also important.  
The central point of this article, however, is that rescaling is not only simply an 
arena and outcome of political struggle, but is a central means by which struggles for 
power and influence are played out. In this case, both states and firms manipulated the 
content and structure of scales and used scale-specific tactics<<mut>>including the 
discursive reconstruction of scale and the material reinvention of articulations of 
scale<<mut>>to recast relationships of cooperation and competition. Altering the 
composition of networks within scales was a means of struggle, although the outcomes 
were often at odds with their aims. Firms’ strategic tactic of flattening out scale and 
creating streamlined passenger flows interacted with continuing scaled regulatory limits 
to produce the greater interpenetration and interdependence of scales. At the same time, 
the firms’ strategies fragmented the territorial composition of politically based scales by 
excluding their less profitable components. These reconfigurations have restratified the 
social world and have differentiated services by customers’ capacity to pay.  
This example highlights that air service patterns can be understood only in the 
context of contested regulatory frameworks, the tensions between cooperative and 
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competitive strategies of states and firms, and the intimate relationship between scale 
politics and the scale division of labor. However, although this examination has 
illuminated the role of privatized transportation networks in the creation of sociospatial 
inequalities, it has only begun the pressing task of exploring how the transportation 
connections between places create the space economy.  
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Figure 1. Australia’s regional air transport networks (circa 1985). Source: Author’s 
adaptation of Department of Transport and Regional Services data, 
http://www.dotars.gov.au/maps. Note: Thin lines represent regional routes. 
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Figure 2. Competition in regional flight sectors. Source: BTE (1999). Note: Route 
density is measured as traffic on board in stages (TOBS). 
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2003<<nut>>2004. Source: Author’s manipulation of data from Avstats, 
http://www.btre.gov.au/statistics/aviation/avline/avline.aspx 
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Figure 5. Changes in the number of flights, regional network, 1998<<nut>>1999 to 
2003<<nut>>2004. Source: Author’s manipulation of data from Avstats, 
http://www.btre.gov.au/statistics/aviation/avline/avline.aspx. 
